Fodors Functionalism Essays -- Body Mind Psychology Essays Searle

Fodors FunctionalismFodor begins his article on the mind- organic structure problem with a review of the incumbent theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body be two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there support be no interaction between the two. The mind could not determine anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist opening, on the other hand, affirms that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have genial nominates. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviouristic psychology and the central-state individuation element theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, preferably of saying Dr. Lux is hungry, one would s ay If there was a dry quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it. The central-state identity theory states that a definite mental state equals a current neurophysiological state. The theory works in a representation connatural to Berkeleys representation of objects. Both mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.Fodor develops the vagary of functionalism by combining certain parts of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory. From logical behaviorism, Fodor incorporates the idea that mental processes can be represented by physical if-then statements. As such, behavior and mental causation are no longer distinct and unable to interact. Also, logical behaviorism provides a way for mental causes to interact with other mental causes. This, in turn, may case in a behavioral effect. The last point is also a characteristic of the central-state identity theory. One d octrine of the central-state identity theory is called detail physicalism. Token physicalism states that all mental states that currently exist are neurophysiological. Thus, token physicalism does not place physical restrictions on the token of substance capable of having mental properties. When the points of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, as described here, are combined, functionalism is the result. The theory of functionalism supposes that a m... ...whether the simulation of mental processes resulting from a computing device program are real mental processes?At the hold on of chapter two, Searle summarizes his criticism of functionalism in the following way. The mental processes of a mind are caused entirely by processes occurring inside the brain. There is no external cause that determines what a mental process will be. Also, there is a greenback between the identification of symbols and the understanding of what the symbols mean. Computer progra ms are defined by symbol identification rather than understanding. On the other hand, minds define mental processes by the understanding of what a symbol means. The conclusion leading from this is that computer programs by themselves are not minds and do not have minds. In addition, a mind cannot be the result of running a computer program. Therefore, minds and computer programs are not entities with the same mental state. They are sort of different and although they both are capable of input and output interactions, but the mind is capable of truly thinking and understanding. This quality is what distinguishes the mental state of a mind from the systemic state of a digital computer.